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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SHIRLEY TURNBAUGHf as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
LEROY TURNBAUGH, for the Benefit
of the Heirs of LEROY TURNBAUGH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 880501-CA

EVAN ANDERSON and RED DOME, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Respondents object to Appellant's statement "Nature of
Proceedings" in that it declares Respondent Evan Anderson
(hereinafter referred to as "Evan Anderson") the owner of a
"defective" front-end loader.

There was no evidence that

the loader was "defective" and, in fact, the evidence was
that it was in proper working order, and Decedent LeRoy
Turnbaugh (hereinafter referred to as "Decedent") died
therein as a result of his own negligent operation of the
loader.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Respondents will respond to the issues as stated by
Appellant.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
Respondents will respond to Appellant's claims.
STATE OF THE CASE
Appellant's Statement of the Case is wrong in that:
1.

It implies that Respondent Red Domef Inc.

(hereinafter referred to as "Red Dome, Inc.")

defended the

action solely on the basis that it only received royalties
of $55,000.00 a year when, in fact, Red Dome defended on
several theories, including the position that it owed no
duty to an invitee such as Decedent when any hazards or
dangers were as obvious to Decedent as to Evan Anderson; Red
Dome, Inc. defended on the basis that Decedent died because
of his own negligence or actions and not because of any on
the part of Evan Anderson; that the "Utah Fencing Statute"
did not apply; and that nuisance law was not applicable;
2.

It implies again that Evan Anderson's front-end

loader had "lethal mechanical problems" when the evidence
showed that it suffered no such mechanical problems, nor any
mechanical problems at all.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents supplement and object to Appellant's
Statement of Facts as follows:
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Evan Anderson did not "lease" the loader to Don
Peterson.

He loaned it to Don Peterson upon an inquiry at

the 4th of: July celebration in Vi 1 Inu.»r>* • wo days before the
accident.

(Tr. page 13)

arrangements.

There were no financial

Evan Anderson had loaned the machine to Don

Peterson several ti mes before.

Evan Anderson had no

knowledge that Decedent was going to operate the loader at
any time.

To the best of Evan Anderson's knowledge, Don

Peterson always personally ran the loader and he was never
informed differently by Don Peterson or anyone.
13/ line Iw

(Tr. page

rrr. • -, - ft, Line 2r>)

Evan Anderson did not inform Don Peterson of the
obvious fact that the loader would quit running when it ran
out of fue
machine.

Mvoaas*: v-.i is just a natural attribute of the

When the engine quits, the brakes and steering

also quit.

(Tr. page 113)

The machine was made that way.

It also was made without a fuel guage.

(Tr. pages 24-25)

Don Peterson had used the machine approximately twenty times
before the incident and had previously used a similar
machine of the same make and with the same natural
attributes.

Decedent had also used the bigger 275 Loader in

June of 19 83 to ] oad overburden.

(Tr. page 114)

Decedent had been on the mining claims several times
before and must be deemed to have been aware of the
extensive open pit mining operation being employed by the
-3-

operators on the Red Dome Claims.

Indeed he had ran the

loader in question all day the day before and one half of
the day of his death on the claim, excavating overburden
from the cinders, thus contributing to the excavation of the
very pit which he backed into.

Decedent was working in

conjunction with the licensee mining cinders on the Red Dome
Claims in the excavation of the very pit in which he backed
into.

(Tr. page 118, line 25, and page 119, line 1-4) (Tr.

pages 196-199)
Any danger or hazard existing from the open pit mining
in progress at the time of his death was as obvious to
Decedent as it was to the owner, Red Dome, Inc., or to any
third party that came upon the property.
Decedent, as operator, was responsible for checking
the fuel in the loader and refilling it when needed.

Don

Peterson provided a pump to be used by the operator to
transfer fuel from the tractor (truck) to the loader when
need€id. Decedent was aware of the method and means provided
for fueling the loader.

(Tr. page 114, line 10) (Tr. page

126, line 23, and page 127)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's claim against Red Dome, Inc. was based on
a theory of nuisance only. Appellant's claim against Evan
Anderson was based on negligence.

Appellant's evidence

failed to show any nuisance. Appellant's evidence also
-4-

failed to show any negligence on the part of Evan Anderson.
Therefore the trial court, in a well reasoned memorandum
opinion, dismissed Appellant's Complaint, no cause of
action.
ARGUMENT
1.

U.C.A. Section 40-5-1 has no application in this

case and therefore cannot be the basis for a nuisance claim.
It is clear from a reading of Section 40-5-1 that it applies
to underground mining situations.

The Red Dome Mining

Claims are open pit cinder mines. The process of mining and
the purpose of the mining claims are clearly set forth in
the testimony of Evan Anderson.

(Tr. page 10.)

Section 40-5-1 provides as follows:
"The owner, lessee, or agent of any mine who
by working such mine has caused or may hereafter
cause the surface of the public domain to form a
pit or sink into which persons or animals are
likely to fall shall cause such pit or sink to be
filled up or to be securely enclosed with a
substantial fence at least four and one-half feet
high; ...M (emphasis added)
It is obvious from reading the statute that it contemplates
an underground mining situation, such as a coal mine, which
will frequently cause the surface of the land over the top
of the underground mine to cave in and form a pit or sink.
Such a cave-in or pit or sink then becomes an unexpected
hazard to persons or animals who are otherwise unadvised of
the underground mine. An owner or operator of an under-5-

ground mine that causes a sink or cave-in is under a duty to
fill up or enclose such a situation.
Such was not the situation in this case.

In his

testimony, Evan Anderson described the Red Dome Mining
Claims.

He was familiar with the claims, having been

involved with them in his employment prior to this incident.
At pages 10-12 of the transcript he describes the mine as an
open pit mining area where the overburden is stripped off
and the cinders mined in an open pit fashion.

He describes

how the open pit mining process is conducted in quest for
different colorsf different grades, and different sizes of
cinders.

On page 12 he describes the Red Dome Claims as

being about 680 acres in size. The pit into which Decedent
drove the loader was in the process of being excavated but
was not caused by an underground mine caving in, forming a
pit or sink.

The area where Decedent was working was not an

area where the natural terrain prevails on the public
domain, except for an unexpected sink hole caused by a
caved-in mine shaft.

(Tr. pages 197-199.)

The Decedent was on the Red Dome Mining Claims for
purposes of excavating for cinders in the pursuit of his
employment with Peterson Machine.

In his testimony, Don

Peterson describes how Decedent had been on the mining
claims numerous times before in the course of his employment
and he had to have been familiar with the mined surface of
-6-

the Red Dome Claims.

The Decedent was on the property as an

employee, an invitee of Peterson Machine, and was therefore
not a member of the public at the time of his accident.
(Tr. pages 118, 119 and 122.)
Section 40-5-1 simply has no application to any of the
facts of this case. A quote from the Honorable Ray M.
Harding's Memorandum Decision is especially applicable here.
"Although there is sufficient Utah law upon
which to base its decision, the Court finds the
following authority highly persuasive and cogent
in view of the facts set forth at trial in this
matter. In Ochampauqh v. City, 588 P.2d 1351,
1359 (Wash. 1979), the Washington Supreme Court,
in its analysis of a similar statute to U.C.A.
Section 40-5-1, favorably cited an earlier
precedent that held that the Washington statute
applied only to excavations, 'the area of which
on the surface is relatively small and which can
be fenced without great expense.1 Then the Court
went on to hold that, 'The concern expressed by
the legislature was that unfenced excavations of
shafts or holes constituted a trap for the unwary.
It was not addressing its attention to the open
and apparent dangers of holes which are filled
with water, such as the pond in this case.'
Likewise, in the Court's opinion, U.C.A.
Section 40-5-1 does not apply to open pit
excavations, such as the one at issue herein, that
are relatively shallow and conspicuous to the
reasonably prudent person. Furthermore, this
statute was designed to protect unknowing persons
or livestock from running afoul of hazards created
by underground mining activities and not
necessarily to safeguard those working about them
that are or should be cognizant of their dangers,
if any."
Since the pit involved in this case was being excavated at
the time the accident occurred, it is ridiculous to expect
-7-

the owner to have a warning sign in place or to have a fence
built around the pit to keep someone from falling into it.
2.

As pointed out in Argument No. 1, Decedent was

not on the Red Dome Mining Claims as a member of the public.
He was on the Red Dome Mining Claims as an employee of
Peterson Machine and would be properly classified at best as
an invitee.

As the owner of the Red Dome Claims, Red Dome/

Inc. had no duty to the Decedent to place a warning indicia
or barrier of some type around the pit.

In the first place,

the pit would have been obvious to Decedent and anyone else
in his position.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals considered a case
involving nearly the same facts as is before the Court in
this case, and the Kentucky Court adequately and fairly set
out the law as it applies in this case.

In Leslie Four

Coal Co. v. Robert Simpson, 333 SW2d 498, 84 ALR 2nd 728,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered the liability of a
strip or other surface mine or quarry operator to an invitee
injured or killed during mining operations. This case is
the leading case to an annotation found at 84 ALR 2nd 728
which considers that subject.

The Leslie Four case was an

action against a strip mining operator for an injury to a
truck driver by an earthslide from a high wall as he stood
between his truck and the high wall.

The Lower Court

granted Judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the Circuit
-8-

Court of Appeals reversed.

It was the Appeals Court's view

that the plaintiff must have known of his dangerous
positionf making applicable the rule that if an invitee
knows or should know of the dangerf the owner of the
premises is not liable. At page 731 f the Court stated the
rule as follows:
"The rule is well established that an
inviter is not responsible to an invitee for an
injury sustained on the inviter's premises from a
cause arising from a defect or a danger which the
invitee knew of or ought to have known of. Nor in
such a situation does the law require the inviter
to place the invitee on notice of such a defect or
danger. This rule is thus stated in detail in 65
CJS Negligence Section 50, page 543, 'The basis of
the inviter's liability for injuries sustained by
the invitee on the premises rests on the owner's
superior knowledge of the danger, and as a general
rule he is not liable for an injury to an invitee
resulting from a danger which was obvious or
should have been observed by the invitee in the
exercise of reasonable care or from a condition
which was as well known or as obvious to the
invitee as to the inviter, or which the inviter
had no reason to believe would not be discovered
by the invitee. There is no duty to warn the
invitee of any defect or danger which is as well
known to the invitee as to the owner or occupant/
or which is obvious or which should be observed by
the invitee in the exercise of ordinary care...'"
The danger in the Leslie Four case was a high wall in an
open pit coal mine.

This apparently means a wall with a

near perpendicular face which might easily slide off and
fall on anyone who might be standing near the high wall.
This was the position in which the plaintiff in the Leslie
Four case placed himself.

The Court of Appeals in the case
-9.

ruled that the danger was obvious to the plaintiff, or
should have been as obvious to the plaintiff as it was to
the mine operator.

(See also the 1978 Utah case which

states the Utah law, similarly Ellertson v. Dansie, 576
P.2d 867.)
The danger in this case was even more obvious than was
the danger in the Leslie Four case. Thus, the owner of
the Red Dome Claims, Red Dome, Inc., had no duty to warn
Decedent of the danger or to otherwise take any affirmative
steps to protect Decedent from any danger which may have
existed as a result of the excavation that was in progress.
Therefore, again, Appellantfs Complaint fails to
allege a cause of action against Red Dome, Inc.
3.

If there was in fact a nuisance, what defenses

are available to Red Dome, Inc.?
First of all, Red Dome, Inc. does not agree that
Section 40-5-1 applies to this situation, nor that the
Respondents did anything amounting to a nuisance in any
sense.
Appellant implies that nuisance law now amounts to
strict liability and that as a result, Respondents have no
defense to the Complaint.

The Appellant relies on the

Branch v. Western Petroleum case, 657 P.2d 267. The facts
of that case are competely distinguishable from those of
this case. A nuisance arises when one landowner uses his
-10-

land in such a way that it is harmful to another landowner
or to another while he is on his own land.

This was the

facts of the Branch case.
Western Petroleum was discharging polluted water into
the underground water formation and also onto the surface of
plaintiff's land.

The court found statutory water law that

strictly forbids such action and found damages for plaintiff
based on strict liability.
In this case the Decedent was an employee who had
voluntarily, and for his own gain, come upon the mining
claims of defendant and had been working there for two days.
The Branch case is no authority whatsoever for strict
liability in this case.

The Supreme Court in Branch

limited its ruling in the following language:
"This court has not heretofore had occasion
to consider the legal principles which govern
liability for the pollution of subterranean waters
by industrial wastes." (657 P.2d 267, at page
272. )
The holding of the Branch case concerning strict liability
is limited to the type of case specified by the court above.
Assuming that a nuisance, only for the sake of
argument, existed in this case, the law allows the Defendant
to raise the defenses of assumption of the risk and
contributory negligence.
Restatement, Torts 2d, Section 840 B, states:
"(1) When a nuisance results from negligent
conduct of the defendant, the contributory
-11-

negligence of the plaintiff is a defense to the
same extent as in other actions founded on
negligence.
(3) When the nuisance results from an abnormally
dangerous condition or activity, contributory
negligence is a defense only if the plaintiff has
voluntarily and unreasonably subjected himself to
the risk of harm."
See also 58 AmJur 2df Nuisance, Section 221, pocket part
supplement.
Restatement Tort, 2d, Section 840C, states:
"In an action for a nuisance the plaintiff's
assumption of risk is a defense to the same extent
as is other torts."
See also 58 AmJur 2d, Nuisance, Section 224, pocket part
supplement.
Even though at the time of this incident, July 6,
1983, Utah law followed a comparative negligence statute,
the above defenses are still viable. Meese v. B.Y.U. 639
P.2d 720 (Utah 1981).
903 (Utah 1984).

Jensen v. Intermountain, 679 P.2d

Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746

P.2d 1191 (Utah 1987).
It can only be concluded that the Decedent died as a
result of his own mistakes and/or negligence and not as a
result of any nuisance created by Red Dome, Inc., nor
negligence on the part of Evan Anderson.

During the morning

of the day he died, Decedent was stripping overburden from a
cinder deposit directly ahead of where Diversified Marketing
was mining cinders from the pit in which Decedent died.
-12-

He

must have known the pit was there as he was basically
working the same area in conjunction with another front-end
loader and operator.

(Tr. pages 182-196.) When the other

operator left to return to the crusher with cinders,
Decedent apparently backed up along the road, away from his
work and loading area, and for no apparent reason ran his
machine out of fuel, turned at a 90 degree angle off the
roadway and into the pit with there being no explanation or
need for the action.

(Tr. pages 23-27, 35-39.)

(Tr. pages

182-196. )
Decedent was negligent and caused his own death
because (a) he allowed the machine to run out of fuel,
killing the engine, if that in fact caused the accident; (b)
he left his work area and drove back up the road away from
where he should have been and turned off the road at a 90
degree angle and into the pit for whatever reason he had, if
that action caused the accident; (c) he was aware of the pit
and failed to avoid it to his own peril, if that fact caused
the accident; and (d) it was his own responsibility to keep
fuel in the machine, if running out caused the accident.
(Tr. pages 89, 102-103, 111.)
4.

The trial court was aware of Appellant's theories

of nuisance.

The pleadings alleged nuisance as a basis for

the cause of action against Red Dome, Inc. The question had
been briefed extensively by both sides in memorandums in
-13-

support of and in opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
and also in trial briefs.
After hearing all the evidence and hearing all the
arguments, the trial court found that there was no nuisance.
(Findings of Fact 3, Record page 168.) This finding was
made by the court because of the fact that Red Dome, Inc.
had no control over the mining process; the hazards and
dangers were as obvious to the Decedent as it was to anyone,
and generally that there simply was no nuisance where the
property in question was open pit mining property actively
being mined and Decedent was there as an invitee and
employee, knowingly and willingly participating in the
mining process.
5.

Appellant's Complaint at the Second Cause of

Action attempts to allege a cause of action against Evan
Anderson.

The allegations allege that Evan Anderson was the

owner of a front-end loader which Decedent was operating at
the time of his death.

This allegation is correct.

However, the front-end loader was not rented from Evan
Anderson by Don Peterson, but rather the loader had been
loaned by Evan Anderson to Don Peterson.

(Tr. page 13.) At

the time of Decedent's death on July 6, 1983, he was
employed by Don Peterson but was not an employee in any
manner of Evan Anderson.

Evan Anderson did not know

Decedent was operating the loader.
-14-

(Tr. pages 16-17.)

The main allegation against Evan Anderson is at
paragraph 4 of the Second Cause of Action (Record page 3.).
That allegation alleges that the loader was in an unsafe
condition, which unsafe condition was known by Evan Anderson
or should have been known by him.
Paragraph 6 (Record page 3.) alleges that the brakes
on the machine and the engine on the said machine failed,
causing the loader to roll backwards into a pit, thereby
causing the death of Decedent.

Elsewhere in the Complaint,

Appellant alleges that the front-end loader was unsafe in
that the engine was faulty and the brakes were faulty.

In

fact, neither the engine nor the brakes nor the machine, as
a whole, were faulty in any manner.

In fact, the opposite

is true. Following are some extractions from the testimony
which supports the Court's findings and judgment of no cause
of action against Evan Anderson.
Tr. page 7;

Line 9, Evan Anderson admits that he

owned the loader in question.
Tr. page 13:

Line 13, Evan Anderson explains that

he loaned Don Peterson the loader.
Tr. page 41, 45-48:

Evan Anderson explains that the

loader had an exceptionally good engine in it, that the
hydraulics were fair, that the tires were fair, and that all
of the components were working.
-15-

Basically the loader was in

really good shape for as old as it was and there was not
anything mechanically wrong with it.
Tr. page 45-48:

Evan Anderson was asked if he had

ever had any trouble with the brakes and he stated that he
had not had trouble with the brakes on that machine.
He was questioned further concerning the brakes and he
describes how he had used the loader prior to the accident
and the brakes had been in working order.

He stated that

after the accident he had put the loader upright again and
loaded it on a trailer to remove it from the area, and in
the process of removing the loader he had used the brakes,
and they had worked properly immediately after the accident.
Tr. page 39-40;

In response to the question, Evan

Anderson describes that the steering worked properly when
the engine was running, but that there was no steering on
the loader if the engine was not running because the
steering was hydraulic and hydraulic pressure was derived
from the engine running and turning a hydraulic pump. He
further explains that it was a natural attribute of the
machine, i.e., the way it was designed, for the steering to
not work when the engine was not running.

The machine had

not been altered from the way it had been manufactured but
had been maintained by Evan Anderson.

See also page 26 for

a discussion concerning the nature of the hydraulic steering
on the loader.
-16-

Tr. page 25-26;

Evan Anderson is questioned

concerning the brakes and the operation of the brakes on the
loader.

He describes the brakes as being air brakes which

require air pressure from an air compressor, which also runs
off the engine. When the engine stopped the air compressor
stopped and the brakes then were basically non-functional by
nature, except for an application or two which would be
powered from an air reservoir but otherwise very limited.
Tr. page 41:

Evan Anderson, when asked if he had

had any trouble with the engine killing or stopping for
unexplained reasons, stated "No, not at all on that loader."
In short, the testimony of Evan Anderson shows that
there was nothing faulty at all about the loader in question
at the time of the accident when Decedent was killed. Since
Appellant's cause of action against Evan Anderson is based
upon an allegation that the machine was faulty and therefore its owner, Evan Anderson, is liable for the death of
Decedent, and since the evidence completely refutes that
allegation, there is no basis herein for Appellant to be
able to maintain its cause of action against Evan Anderson.
Appellant attempted to base its claim of negligence
against Evan Anderson on the testimony of Mike Haveron.
(Tr. pages 94-101.) Mike Haveron had no knowledge at all
about the loader in question.

He worked for Fillmore

Products, a previous licensee of Red Dome, Inc., but quit
-17-

during the year 1980.

(Tr. pages 96-97.) The loader in

question was not purchased and moved to the cinder mines
until June of 1981, a year after Mr. Haveron was no longer
employed at the mines. His experience was with a different
loader, a Michigan 12 5 and two 175B loaders, none of which
was the loader in question.

(Tr. pages 177-178.)

The testimony offered by Appellant from Mr. Haveron in
his brief, page 13, was objected to by Evan Anderson at the
trial because of its immateriality and irrelevancy.
page 9, line 8.)

(Tr.

It did not concern the loader in question.

Finally, the testimony was neutral and did not support
Appellant's theories for liability.
6.

Appellant argues that Evan Anderson should have

warned Don Peterson about "inherent dangers" (which were not
dangers in the first place, but natural attributes of the
machine in question).

Next, Appellant argues that since

Evan Anderson failed to warn Don Peterson, he is thus liable
in negligence for the death of Decedent.
In the first place, warning Don Peterson about the
natural attributes of the machine on July 4, 1983, is
ridiculous because Don Peterson had used the loader
approximately twenty times prior, over a course of two years
or more, and he had previously owned another loader of the
same age and make, but one size larger.
-18-

Finallyf Evan Anderson did not know Decedent was going
to run the loader and there was neither duty nor privy
between Evan Anderson and the Decedent under any theory of
law.
CONCLUSION
The Court's Judgment of no cause of action against
Appellant's Complains was fully and completely supported by
the evidence and law and should be upheld by the Court.
DATED this / /

day of January, 1989.
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Attorn
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I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
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East Fourth South, Suite 104, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
postage prepaid, this / ^ d a y of January, 1989.
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